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NOTE
Does the Constitutional Right to Privacy
Protect Forced Disclosure of Sexual
Orientation?
by ANNE C. HYDORN*
"Our personhood must remain inviolate: that is what privacy
protects; that is its principle. ,,
In 1997, Marcus Wayman, a high school football player,2 and
his 17-year old male friend were found together in a car in a parking
lot by Philadelphia police officers, F. Scott Wilinsky and Thomas
Hobin. 3 After an investigation, it became apparent to the officers
that Wayman and his friend had been drinking alcohol.4 The young
men acted evasively when questioned about what they were doing in
the parking lot and upon performing a search, the police officers
uncovered two condoms.5 Officer Wilinsky asked them whether or
not they were in the parking lot with the intention to engage in
sexual activity, to which both eventually answered yes.6 The officers
then arrested both boys for underage drinking and took them to the
police station.7 At the station, Officer Wilinsky lectured them on the
* J.D. Candidate, May 2003, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
1. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REv. 737, 739 (1989).
2. Mary Claire Dale, Gay Teen's Suicide Leads to Lawsuit Against Police, CHI. SUN-
TIMES, Nov. 6, 2001, at 30.
3. Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 192 (3d Cir. 2000).
4. ld
5. Id
6. Id.
7. Id.
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Bible and homosexuality8 and allegedly asked them if they were
"queer." 9 The officer then told Wayman that if he did not inform his
grandfather that he was homosexual, he would disclose it to his
grandfather himself. 10 After the officers released the boys from
custody, Wayman committed suicide in his home." Wayman's
mother then filed suit against the Borough of Minersville, the
officers, and others alleging that the officers' actions violated
Wayman's constitutional right to privacy (among other
complaints).12
The right to privacy is not enumerated in the United States
Constitution. The United States Supreme Court first introduced the
substantive privacy doctrine in Griswold v. Connecticut.13 It was in
this case that the Court stated that the right to privacy was found in
"penumbras" that are given "life and substance" by the Bill of
Rights. 14 The Court declared that the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and
Ninth Amendments combined to form a "zone of privacy."' 15 Later,
the Court rooted the right's location in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the position advocated by Justice Harlan in
his concurring opinion in Griswold.16  Cases after Griswold
demonstrate that "two different kinds of [privacy] interests" have
emerged. 17 The first privacy interest is one in "avoiding disclosure
of personal matters" and the second is one of "independence in
making certain kinds of important decisions."'18 This second interest
provides for a limitation on government's power to substantively
regulate conduct. 19  Examples of the latter include marital
relationships,20  contraception,2' abortion rights,22  and family
8. Id. at 192-93
9. Dale, supra note 2.
10. Sterling, 232 F.3d at 193.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
14. Id. at 484.
15. Id at 484-85.
16. Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1335, 1393-94
(1992); see Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring).
17. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-99 (1977).
18. Id at 599-600.
19. Id. at 600 n.26.
20. See Loving v. Virginia, 368 U.S. 1 (1967).
21. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
22. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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relationships.23 In 1986, the Supreme Court decided Bowers v.
Harwick, and held that there was nothing in the Constitution that
confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in
sodomy. 24  The court reasoned that private sexual conduct between
consenting adults is not insulated from government proscription and
that the right to engage in criminalized consensual sodomy did not
fall into any of the rights asserted in the line of privacy cases.
In Walls v. City of Petersburg, the Fourth Circuit expanded the
Bowers holding by stating that it was controlling on whether or not
the right to privacy extends to forced disclosure of private
homosexual conduct (a forced "public outing" per se).26 This
interpretation of Bowers essentially wraps the two types of privacy
interests discussed above into one by assuming that, where the right
to privacy is concerned, forced disclosure of a particular kind of
conduct is equal to the conduct itself. The Third Circuit, in Sterling
v. Borough of Minersville, disagreed, reasoning that Bowers only
focused on whether a state could constitutionally prohibit consensual
homosexual conduct.27  The Third Circuit held that sexual
orientation is an intimate aspect of one's personality, and thus is
entitled to protection from unwarranted disclosure under the
23. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S.494 (1977).
24. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 189 (1986). On March 26, 2003, just prior to
publication of this article, the United State Supreme Court heard oral arguments for Lawrence v.
Texas. 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. App. 2001), cert. granted, 123 S.Ct. 661 (U.S. Dec. 2, 2002) (No.
02-102). The case involves a constitutional challenge to a Texas statute that makes it a
misdemeanor for a person to engage in "deviate sexual intercourse" with another individual of the
same sex. Id. at 350. In Bowers, the similar Georgia statute applied to all individuals, not just
those of the same sex. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188. The Court of Appeals of Texas in Lawrence
found no violation of the right to privacy (federal or state), stating that privacy does not protect
homosexual conduct, which "has been a criminal offense for well over a century." Lawrence, 41
S.W.3d at 361. Petitioners have asked the Supreme Court to overrule Bowers, arguing in one
instance that Bowers has not become a case that embodies our national culture, but is an
anomalous ruling since "the Nation has continued to reject the extreme intrusion into the realm
of personal privacy approved in that case, so that now three-fourths of the States have repealed or
invalidated such laws - including the very law upheld by Bowers." U.S. Brief of Petitioners at
*30, Lawrence v. Texas, 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. App. 2001) (No. 02-102). Rather than overruling
Bowers explicitly through a due process privacy analysis, the Court instead seems poised to
overturn the Texas law on equal protection grounds. Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Seems
Set to Reverse a Sodomy Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2003, at A18. However, if the Court goes so
far as to overturn its Bowers holding, it would further the argument of this Note. Namely, if the
Court finds that homosexual conduct (i.e., sodomy) itself is privacy protected, recognition of a
constitutional right of privacy in preventing forced disclosure of such conduct or sexual
orientation would likely not be far behind if challenged.
25. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
26. Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 193 (4th Cir. 1990).
27. Sterling, 232 F.3d at 195 n.3.
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constitutional right to privacy, and that neither Bowers nor Walls is
controlling on the issue.
28
This Note will address the split between the Third and Fourth
Circuits regarding the holding of Bowers and evaluate whether or not
Bowers impliedly extends to forced disclosure of sexual orientation
and private homosexual activity. It will argue that Bowers does not
extend to forced disclosure of sexual orientation and that the
reasoning in Sterling is correct. Furthermore, it will survey contexts
in which forced disclosure issues most often arise and why it is
essential that the right to privacy extends into these areas. It will
conclude that, based on right to privacy jurisprudence and despite the
holding in Bowers, the right of privacy should and does extend to
protect the privacy of sexual orientation.
This Note is organized as follows. Part I will discuss the right to
privacy jurisprudence and its history. Part II will first analyze the
pivotal case of Bowers v. Hardwick and its impact on privacy and
homosexual conduct. Secondly, Part II will address the circuit split
in Walls and Sterling and discuss how the courts each applied right-
to-privacy reasoning to disclosure of sexual orientation. Part III will
survey and discuss examples of the various contexts in which forced
disclosure of sexual orientation might arise. Finally, Part IV will
discuss why the right to privacy must extend to forced disclosure in
its various contexts and why the reasoning in Sterling is correct.
I. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Concept of Privacy and its Fundamental Origins
Few agree on the meaning of the right to privacy29 and many
acknowledge that the jurisprudence in this area is confusing at best.
The idea of privacy often connotes several concepts: the right to be
let alone,3' the right to make personal decisions without
28. Id. at 195 n.3, 196.
29. The first notion of a common law right to privacy can be found in the celebrated law
review article of Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, entitled The Right to Privacy, which was
published in the HarvardLaw Review in 1890. Gormley, supra note 16, at 1336; see Samuel D.
Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
30. See Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 737; see also W.A. Parent, A New Definition of Privacy
for the Law, in PRIVACY VOLUME I: THE CONCEPT OF PRIVACY 23 (Raymond Wacks ed., 1993)
(stating that "privacy jurisprudence is in conceptual shambles").
31. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199 (Blackman, J., dissenting); Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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interference, 3 2 and the right to have personal information remain
undisclosed to others unless one provides permission to do
otherwise.33 Because the Supreme Court declared a constitutional
right to privacy despite a lack of specific enumeration, definition and
parameters of that right remain elusive, even though numerous court
opinions and legal scholars have tried to dispel its ambiguity.
34
Before the Court was able to establish the right to privacy doctrine, it
had to acknowledge that the rights protected by the Constitution are
not necessarily limited to those that are specifically enumerated.35
The originating authority for this idea is often found in the Ninth
Amendment, 36 which states, "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution,
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people. 37  Some history shows that the framers
included such language to negate the possible interpretation that the
enumeration of certain fundamental rights reflected the intention to
exclude those not specifically mentioned.38 It was not until 1965,
however, that the Supreme Court announced privacy as a
fundamental right protected by the Constitution, irrespective of its
lack of enumeration.39 Many cases that followed expanded on the
right to privacy doctrine, 40 though its exact parameters remain ill-
defined.
32. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 204-05 (Blackman, J., dissenting); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S.
589, 598-99 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
33. See Sterling, 232 F.3d at 195; Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 303 (3d Cir. 2000); Doe v.
Southeastern Penn. Transp. Auth., 72 F.3d 1133, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995); Fraternal Order of Police
v. City of Phila., 812 F.2d 105, 110 (3d Cir. 1987); United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,
638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980).
34. See Lois Shepherd, Looking Forward with the Right of Privacy, 49 U. KAN. L. REV.
251, 251 (2001) ("if the question seeks an answer to what the right of privacy means today, any
answer still hazards a guess"); W.A. Parent, supra note 30, at 23 ("privacy jurisprudence is in
conceptual shambles"); Jack Hirshleifer, Privacy: Its Origin, Function, and Future, in PRIVACY
VOLUME I: THE CONCEPT OF PRIVACY 649 (Raymond Wacks ed., 1993) ("privacy is a concept
that might be described as autonomy within society") (emphasis in original); Rubenfeld, supra
note 1, at 739 ("At the heart of the right to privacy, there has always been a conceptual
vacuum."); G. Sydney Buchanan, The Right of Privacy: Past, Present, and Future, 16 OHIO N.U.
L. REV. 403, 508 (1989) (defining the right of privacy as a subset of the liberty interests expressly
protected by the due process clauses of the Constitution).
35. Buchanan, supra note 34, at 404-05.
36. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 741.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
38. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
39. Id. at 485.
40. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969);
Loving v. Virginia, 368 U.S. 1 (1967).
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B. Griswold v. Connecticut
The United States Supreme Court first announced the doctrine
of the constitutional right to privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut.
4 1
Griswold was Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League
in Connecticut, which distributed birth control information, advice,
and prescriptions to married couples.42 Connecticut statutes in effect
at the time prohibited any person from using drugs or devices to
prevent conception (or be subject to possible fines and
imprisonment) and likewise provided the same punishment for any
individual who aided or abetted a person in committing such an
offense.43 After Griswold was arrested and found guilty under the
statute, he challenged it as a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment
rights.44
The Court noted that the statute at issue "operate[d] directly on
an intimate relation of husband and wife and their physician's role in
one aspect of that relation," but recognized that neither the
Constitution nor the Bill of Rights directly addressed the privacy of
intimate association.4 5 The Court then listed numerous earlier cases
where it had acknowledged a variety of rights under the Constitution
that were not specifically delineated.46 For example, the Court
stated, "[t]he right of freedom of speech and press includes not only
the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right to
receive, the right to read... and freedom of inquiry, freedom of
thought, and freedom to teach. ' '4 7 It then went on to say, "[w]ithout
those peripheral rights the specific rights would be less secure.
' 48
The Court reasoned that all of the foregoing cases together
41. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485. It should be noted, however, that Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), were earlier cases in
which the Court held that "certain enumerated, non-economic rights are a part of the liberty that
the due process clause protects against undue governmental infringement." Buchanan, supra note
34, at 415. In these two cases, the Court established that parental autonomy in child rearing was
"protected by the due process clauses against unreasonable governmental regulation." Id. at 416.
Thus, the Court provided for rights clearly related to constitutional "privacy" interests as early as
the 1920s. Id.
42. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 482.
46. Id. at 482-84.
47. Id. at 482.
48. Id. at 482-83.
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"suggest[ed] that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help
them give life and substance. ' 49 Finally, it concluded that the First,
Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments combined to form a
"zone of privacy" in which the marriage relationship exists and is
thus protected from state regulation that sweeps too broadly.5 °
Justice Goldberg, in his concurrence, elaborated on the
majority's holding that fundamental rights exist in the Constitution
that are not enumerated or explicitly guaranteed in the Bill of
Rights. 51  He determined that the Ninth Amendment protects a
fundamental right of privacy.52 He stated:
The Ninth Amendment to the Constitution may be regarded by some
as a recent discovery and may be forgotten by others, but since 1791
it has been a basic part of the Constitution which we were sworn to
uphold. To hold that a right so basic and fundamental and so
deeprooted in our society as the right of privacy in marriage may be
infringed because that right is not guaranteed in so many words by
the first eight amendments to the Constitution i 3to ignore the Ninth
Amendment and to give it no effect whatsoever.
Justice Goldberg emphasized that the framers did not intend the
first eight amendments to be exhaustive of individual liberties, and
that the Court should determine fundamental rights through analysis
of tradition and the collective conscience of the people, and then
determine whether a particular principle is so firmly rooted in society
that it should be deemed "fundamental., 54  Using an intent-based
argument, Justice Goldberg argued that the framers put forth the
Ninth Amendment to quiet the fears that "specific mention of certain
rights [in the other amendments] would be interpreted as a denial
that others were protected.,
55
C. The Griswold Line of Cases
After the Court decided Griswold, many cases that followed
expanded the scope of the right to privacy. For example, two years
49. Id. at 484.
50. Id. at 484-86.
51. Id. at 491 (Goldberg, J., concurring); see also David Helscher, Griswold v. Connecticut
and the Unenumerated Right of Privacy, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 33, 37 (1994).
52. Helscher, supra note 51, at 37.
53. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 491 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 492-93 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 489 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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after Griswold, the Court heard and decided Loving v. Virginia
56
wherein the Court addressed whether or not the state has a right to
infringe upon a person's right to marry the person of his or her
choice.57 After an interracial couple was married in Virginia and
subsequently indicted under a Virginia statute banning interracial
marriage, they challenged the statute as a violation of the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.58
The Court held that the statute violated the Constitution and that the
state may not infringe on a person's freedom to marry a person of
another race. 59 Furthermore, the Court declared that the "freedom to
marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men" and
"marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man."'0
In subsequent cases, the Court expanded the doctrine of privacy
beyond the institution of marriage. In Stanley v. Georgia, the
Court held that a man could not be lawfully convicted for mere
possession of obscene material in his home. The Court reasoned that
an individual's right to read or observe what he pleases is
fundamental to one's individual liberty and the state may not
regulate such activity in the privacy of one's home.62 Elaborating,
the Court stated:
Whatever may be the justifications for other statutes regulating
obscenity, we do not think they reach into the privacy of one's own
home. If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State
has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what
books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole
constitutional heritage rebels athe thought of giving government the
power to control men's minds.
The Court also reaffirmed that freedom from governmental
56. 368 U.S. 1 (1967).
57. Id. at 2.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 12.
60. Id.
61. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (extending the right to privacy
to cover personal choices in matters of family life); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (ascribing
a qualified right of privacy to a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (protecting equal right of single persons to access contraception as is
afforded married persons); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (protecting in-home
possession of obscene material).
62. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568.
63. Id. at 565.
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intrusion into personal privacy was a fundamental right.64
Likewise, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court moved beyond the
realm of privacy in marriage to hold that a statute prohibiting the
distribution of contraception to single persons violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 65 There, the Court
found Griswold to apply equally to unmarried persons. 66 The Court
stated that "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion to matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.,
67
The well-known case of Roe v. Wade extended the constitutional
right of privacy to a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy.
6 8
In its reasoning, the Court noted the harm that could be caused to
women who are denied such a choice: distress, psychological harm,
mental and physical difficulties as a result of child care, and the
social stigma of being an unwed mother.6 9 The Court did not extend
its decision, however, to include the broad statement that an
individual has a right to do whatever he pleases with his own body,
concluding that it did not consider the privacy right of abortion to be
absolute.7 In Roe, the Court firmly established that the right to
privacy is located in the Fourteenth Amendment.7 1
Finally, in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, the Court extended
the right of privacy to encompass personal choices in matters of
family life.72 In Moore, Inez Moore lived in her home with her son
and two grandsons who were first cousins. 73  A local housing
ordinance limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to single families,
but then defined family in a way that disqualified Moore's family.
74
As a result, Moore was convicted of criminally violating the
ordinance. 75 In overturning Moore's conviction, the Court stated:
64. Id. at 564.
65. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 443.
66. Id. at 453; see Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-86 (creating a "zone of privacy" surrounding
the marital relationship which is to remain free from unwarranted governmental intrusion).
67. Id.
68. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 154.
71. Id. at 153.
72. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977).
73. Id. at 494.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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'liberty is not a series of isolated points pricked out in [specific
Constitutional] terms... [but] a rational continuum... [that]
includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions ... and
which also recognizes ... that certain interests require particularly
careful scruy of the state needs asserted to justify their
abridgment.'
On the basis of those interests, the Court held that East
Cleveland's housing ordinance could not impose limits on the types
of groups or family members that could occupy a single dwelling
unit.77
In sum, while Griswold and the cases that followed set forth the
constitutional right of privacy and defined some of its contours and
parameters, much has been left open and unanswered.78  Many
commentators continue to ask what exactly the right to privacy
entails and how much is encompassed in its doctrine. In reviewing
the main line of privacy cases, the Court has furthered the doctrine in
response to specific fact scenarios, but has not delineated any steps
or tests to determine the parameters of the privacy line. Justice
Goldberg in his Griswold concurrence argued that courts must
analyze tradition and look to the collective conscience of the people
to determine which principles are so deeply rooted in our society that
they are rendered fundamental. 80 However, is such a line of analysis
really practical in application? How easy would it be to determine
what our "collective conscience" is without subconsciously imposing
our own ideas of morality and rightness? When reviewing the
constitutional right to privacy in the realm of homosexuality, most
would likely agree that our collective conscience has not historically
embraced homosexual conduct. Yet, would those same people
embrace the idea that personal information about their own sexuality
is fair game for public disclosure, homosexual or not? Defining the
parameters of privacy in this area has proven difficult.
76. Id. at 502.
77. Id. at 506.
78. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 750-51.
79. For examples of the broad range of answers to this question, see the following sources:
Shepherd, supra note 34, at 251 (commenting that any attempt at answering such a question "still
hazards a guess"); Jack Hirshleifer, Privacy: Its Origin, Function, and Future, in PRIVACY
VOLUME I: THE CONCEPT OF PRIVACY, supra note 34, at 649 (stating that privacy is "a concept
that might be described as autonomy within society") (emphasis in original); Buchanan, supra
note 34, at 508 (defining the right of privacy as a subset of the liberty interests expressly
protected by the due process clauses of the Constitution).
80. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 492-493 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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II. PRIVACY AND HOMOSEXUALITY
A. An Analysis of Bowers v. Hardwick
In Bowers v. Hardwick,8 1 the Court narrowed the doctrine of
privacy and confronted the issue for the first time in the context of
homosexual behavior. In Bowers, an Atlanta police officer first
encountered Hardwick outside a gay bar where he watched Bowers
throw a beer bottle into a trashcan.82  The officer confronted
Hardwick, asking him what he was doing and Hardwick told him he
worked at the bar, thereby revealing to the officer that he was
homosexual.83 The officer then issued him a ticket for drinking in
public.84 Hardwick later failed to appear in court due to confusion
over his appearance date and within two hours the officer that issued
the ticket showed up at Bowers' home with a warrant for his arrest.8
5
Although not home at the time the officer showed up, after learning
about the officer's visit to his home, Hardwick promptly paid the
fine for his ticket.86 Three weeks later, three straight men severely
beat Hardwick outside his home. 87 A few days after the beating, the
officer again showed up at Hardwick's home claiming to have a
warrant for his arrest, at which time he found Hardwick in his
bedroom having sex with another man.88 The officer arrested both
men, charging them with violating a Georgia statute that
criminalized sodomy.89  Afterward, Hardwick challenged the
constitutionality of the statute.90 The Eleventh Circuit held that the
statute violated Hardwick's fundamental rights because "homosexual
activity is a private and intimate association" protected by the
Constitution.91 Due to a circuit split on the issue, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.92
81. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
82. Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1431, 1437-38
(1992).
83. Id. at 1438.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id
87. Id
88. Id.
89. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 187-88.
90. Id. at 188.
91. Id. at 189 (citing Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (11 th Cir. 1985)).
92. Id.
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The Court was clear from the outset that its opinion had nothing
to do with whether or not laws against sodomy were wise or
desirable.93  Rather, the Court intended to resolve the issue of
whether the Constitution protected such activity and, if so, would
thereby invalidate all state laws that made sodomy a criminal
behavior. 94  The Court disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit's
conclusion that the prior cases establishing the scope of the right to
privacy doctrine extended to protect the right of homosexuals to
engage in acts of sodomy.95 The Court reasoned that none of the
cases regarding marriage and procreation stood for "the proposition
that any kind of private sexual conduct between consenting adults is
constitutionally insulated from state proscription."96 Writing for the
majority, Justice White then went on to demonstrate how laws
against sodomy are deeply rooted in our history, criticizing the
notion that individuals have an anciently rooted, traditional and
fundamental right to engage in such behavior and stating that such an
argument would be "at best" tongue-in-cheek, so to speak. 97 In
response to Bowers' reliance on Stanley, the Court emphasized that
illegal conduct in the home is not protected just because it occurs in
the privacy of one's home. 98 Along that line, the Court expressed
concern over a slippery slope-in other words, if homosexual
conduct is criminal, yet protected in the home, that could be
interpreted to mean that the same would hold true for adultery, incest
and other similar crimes.99 The Court finally reasoned that because
moral sentiments underlie all kinds of laws, Hardwick's argument
that the electorate fashioned the law on its belief that homosexual
sodomy is "immoral and unacceptable" was not, under rational basis
review, enough to declare all state laws criminalizing sodomy
invalid.10 '
Justice Blackmun, joined by three other Justices, sharply
dissented, disagreeing with the majority about what the fundamental
right at issue was. 10 1 According to Blackmun, the fundamental right
93. Id. at 190.
94. Id. at 190-91.
95. Id. at 191.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 192-94.
98. Id. at 195.
99. Id. at 195-96.
100. Id. at 196.
101. Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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at the heart of this case was the "'right to be let alone."" 0 2
Blackmun also took issue with the majority's seemingly archaic
notion that, just because the laws have existed since the dawn of
time, they should continue to exist, regardless of whether or not they
conflict with the Constitution.'0 3 In his dissent, Blackmun states
"[w]e protect ... [certain] rights ... because they form so central a
part of an individual's life." [04 He later emphasized that while the
Court claims to only refuse to recognize a fundamental right to
engage in homosexual sodomy, it "really has refused to
recognize... the fundamental interest all individuals have in
controlling the nature of their intimate associations with others."'
0 5
Blackmun asserted that because of this, the Court's decision betrayed
values deeply rooted in American history.
10 6
B. Walls v. City of Petersburg and Sterling v. Borough of Minersville: The
Circuit Split over Bowers' Application to Forced Disclosure of Sexual
Orientation
Although the majority in Bowers did not address the issue of
forced disclosure of sexual orientation, the Fourth Circuit
nonetheless found Bowers controlled in that context. 107 In Walls v.
City of Petersburg, Walls, a black city police department employee,
was required to undergo a background check (along with other
similarly situated employees) after the program she administered was
transferred to a new city department.'0 8 She refused to fill out the
background questionnaire because of four particular questions to
which she specifically objected, one being whether or not she ever
had sexual relations with a person of the same sex.l°9 Because of her
refusal, the Project Administrator suspended her without pay and
recommended that she be terminated. 0 Although the department
later decided that the policy of completing background checks did
not apply to Walls, they instituted a new policy stating that all
102. Id (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.
dissenting)).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 204.
105. Id. at 206.
106. Id. at214.
107. Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 193 (4th Cir. 1990).
108. Id. at 190.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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employees in her position still had to complete the questionnaire."'
Again, she refused, but this time the City Manager terminated her. 1 2
In a Section 198313 claim against the city, Walls alleged that her
discharge was in violation of her constitutional right to privacy,
freedom of association, and due process of law. 14
In its decision, the Fourth Circuit put forth the two recognized
types of privacy interests as previously enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Whalen v. Roe:115 1) an individual's interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters, and 2) an interest in independently
being able to make certain important kinds of decisions." 6 The court
put forth the first step to defining the coverage of the constitutional
right of privacy as looking to whether or not the information is
within "an individual's reasonable expectations of
confidentiality."" 7  If it is, privacy protection applies (noting,
however, that a compelling state interest can still outweigh the
protection). 18 One might ask, then, if the government (in this case,
the City of Petersburg) has a compelling interest in knowing its
employees' sexual preferences or orientation. How does an
administrative employee's sexual orientation impact or relate to his
or her job duties and performance? Walls, of course, argued that
questions regarding one's sexual activities were an "unwarranted
government intrusion" and that such activities are within the zone of
privacy, established earlier in Griswold.119 Yet, without more than
one four-sentence paragraph, the Fourth Circuit ignored its own test
regarding expectations of confidentiality and found Bowers
controlling, stating that Bowers rejected the idea that private sexual
conduct between consenting adults is constitutionally protected from
state proscription. 12  Without further explanation, the court moved
on to the other three background questions that were the subject of
11. Id.
112. Id.
113. Federal section 1983 provides a civil remedy to those whose rights have been violated
under color of state law. Walls, 895 F.2d at 191-92; see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003).
114. Walls, 895 F.2d at 189.
115. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
116. Walls, 895 F.2d at 192 (quoting Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600).
117. Walls, 895 F.2d at 192.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 193.
120. Id.
[Vol. 30:2
Walls' objections. 12 1 It is unclear how the court made the leap from
a holding about the validity of criminalizing private sexual conduct
(sodomy) to its application on forced disclosure of any homosexual
activity, which by its very nature forcibly discloses the nature of
one's sexual orientation.
Are we to understand from the court's ruling that public
disclosure of one's sexual behavior is not within a class of
information guarded by reasonable expectations of confidentiality,
such that the test the Fourth Circuit enunciated does not even warrant
discussion of the matter? Despite the fact that the statute at issue in
Bowers did not differentiate between individuals based on sexual
orientation (i.e., the law against sodomy applied to both homosexuals
and heterosexuals), like the Fourth Circuit, many courts and
commentators have interpreted the case to be a general holding about
homosexuality. 12 2 The Sterling facts, as disconcerting as they are,
warrant a closer look at whether the courts may correctly extend
Bowers to forced disclosure of sexual orientation, and whether
sexual orientation falls under the constitutional right to privacy.
In Sterling, the Third Circuit expressly disagreed with the
Fourth Circuit's implication that the applicability of Bowers to
disclosure of sexual orientation was so clear that it could effectively
eliminate any real discussion on the matter. 123 On the contrary, the
Third Circuit gave the issue due consideration.' 24 The Third Circuit
was clear in stating that Bowers' ruling focused on "the practice of
homosexual sodomy and is not determinative of whether the right to
privacy protects an individual from being forced to disclose his
sexual orientation., 125  Punishing homosexual status is outside
Bowers' scope. 126 The Third Circuit furthered its analysis stating
that sexual preference is an "intensely personal decision" and that the
more intimate the information "the more justified is the expectation
that it will not be subject to scrutiny." 127  The Third Circuit
concluded that sexual orientation is an "intimate aspect" of one's
121. See id
122. Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531, 531 (1992).
123. Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 195 n.3 (3d Cir. 2000); see Walls, 895
F.2d at 193.
124. See Sterling, 232 F.3d at 194-96.
125. Id. at 194-95 (citing the Supreme Court's holding in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660, 667 (1962), that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid punishment of status as
opposed to conduct).
126. Sterling, 232 F.3d at 195.
127. Id.
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personality and is constitutionally protected, 128 mirroring much of
the sentiment in the Bowers dissent. 129  To hold otherwise would
have far-reaching implications on those that would be affected by a
contrary ruling as evidenced by surveying some of the contexts in
which forced disclosure might arise.
III. FORCED DISCLOSURE OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION
IN CONTEXT
A. Forced Disclosure Generally
A forced "outing" can be described as "the forced exposure of a
person's same-sex orientation."'130  Not all may realize how
emotionally intense the decision can be to voluntarily disclose
homosexual orientation. When such disclosure occurs without
permission, it can cause "real harm on real people" and severely
affect personal "dignity, privacy and autonomy."' 1 A person who
chooses to "stay in the closet" might do so to feel safe, to preserve
his privacy, 3 2  or because he fears the "legal and societal
consequences of exposure."' 33 The disclosure of one's homosexual
orientation, be it voluntary or involuntary, may result in a variety of
negative outcomes, including "personal rejection and isolation,
employment discrimination, loss of child custody, harassment and
violence.' 34  Because of the potential psychological effects of
disclosure of sexual orientation, it should ultimately be left to the
individual to determine when and how to disclose such private
information. To allow forced disclosure would be to invade personal
autonomy and to take away the control each of us has over our own
life. 135 After all, as one commentator said, "[s]exuality is at the very
core of a person's identity."'
' 36
128. Id. at 196.
129. Id.; see Bowers, 478 U.S. at 206-20.
130. Katheleen Guzman, About Outing: Public Discourse, Private Lives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q.
1531, 1531 (1995).
131. Id. at 1532.
132. Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1, 3 (1994).
133. Guzman, supra note 130, at 1548.
134. Gregory M. Herek, Why Tell If You're Not Asked? Self-Disclosure, Intergroup Contact,
and Heterosexuals' Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men, in OUT IN FORCE: SEXUAL
ORIENTATION AND THE MILITARY 204 (Gregory M. Herek et al. eds., 1996).
135. Guzman, supra note 130, at 1548.
136. Barbara Moretti, Outing: Justifiable or Unwarranted Invasion of Privacy? The Private
Facts Tort as a Remedy for Disclosures of Sexual Orientation, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 30:2
DISCLOSURE OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION
B. Adolescent Homosexuality
The issues surrounding forced disclosure of sexual orientation
are especially clear in the context of adolescent homosexuality.
Nowhere are the potential effects of such disclosure clearer than in
the Sterling facts themselves. Pediatrician Susanne M. Stronski
Huwiler, and Associate Professor of Pediatrics, Gary Remafedi,
describe the 'coming out' process as a progression that occurs in four
main stages. 137 The first stage comes in the form of sensitization,
whereby in childhood or early adolescence a homosexual individual
will experience a vague feeling of being different from their peers,
but may not identify themselves as "sexually different."' 138  The
second stage, generally occurring in early or middle adolescence,
involves a perception of being sexually different and an awareness of
same-sex arousal.' 39 During this time, significant inner turmoil and
anxiety are likely because of confusion, stemming from stigma,
ignorance and misinformation about homosexuality. " In the third
stage, called "identity assumption," the individual begins to accept
his or her orientation and volitional disclosure may occur. 141 During
the fourth and final stage, homosexual individuals integrate their
homosexuality into their lives through intimate same-sex
relationships and find feelings of satisfaction as they disclose their
orientation to more and more people. 142 Drs. Huwiler and Remafedi
note that premature disclosure during the third stage can create
extreme emotional stress and that "careful decisions and timing are
critical to the outcome."'
143
Because peers critically affect adolescent development,
homosexual adolescents may suffer from the psychosocial effects of
homophobia exhibited in the form of rejection, verbal abuse, and
physical assaults, all during a time when teens already face normal
feelings of vulnerability.' 4  The psychosocial effects may include
"increased rates of depression and suicide, school problems,
857, 865 (1993).
137. Susanne M. Stronski Huwiler and Gary Remafedi, Adolescent Homosexuality, 33 REV.
JUR. U.I.P.R. 151, 160-61 (1999).
138. Id. at 160.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 161.
143. Id. at 160.
144. Id. at 163.
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substance abuse, running away, eating disorders, high-risk sexual
behavior, and illegal conduct."' 145  These potential effects
demonstrate the delicacy of handling adolescent homosexuality
properly. As was the case with Marcus Wayman, suicide may well
result from invading the privacy of a young person by "outing" them
to friends or family, particularly where such "outing" fails to give
consideration to the delicate stage adolescents may be in regarding
their sexual orientation. This is especially true in light of the fact
that homosexual adolescents already have a higher rate of suicide
than the general adolescent. 146 Sexual orientation is a private matter,
and, particularly where the ramifications of involuntary disclosure
are extremely high, the need for constitutional protection of this
private information takes on an even greater importance.
C. Sexual Orientation in the Military
The United States military provides another example of where
forced disclosure of sexual orientation might have devastating
effects. Prior to 1993, the United States had a long-standing policy
that homosexual individuals may not serve in the military.'14  There
was no differentiation between homosexual orientation and
homosexual conduct. 148  Today, Congress has adopted a policy
known as "Don't Ask, Don't Tell, Don't Pursue.' ' 149 Under this new
policy, sexual orientation alone is not grounds for discharge from the
military, though homosexual conduct or public reference to one's
homosexuality is still a dischargeable offense.150 Under the policy, if
a person presents credible information about another's sexual
orientation or if a person states directly that he or she is homosexual,
it creates a rebuttable presumption of homosexual conduct, which is
grounds for discharge from the military.' 51 The presumption would
be nearly impossible to rebut given the difficulty of proving that one
145. Id.
146. Studies show that attempted suicide rates of homosexual adolescents range from 20% to
42%. Id.
147. Christopher B. Turcotte, Comment, When "Coming out of the Closet" Means Being
Tossed Out of the Military: Homosexual Discrimination in the Armed Forces, 2 SETON HALL
CONST. L.J. 805, 806 (1992).
148. Peter D. Jacobson, Sexual Orientation and the Military: Some Legal Considerations, in
OUT IN FORCE: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE MILITARY 39 (Gregory M. Herek et al. eds.,
1996).
149. See 10 U.S.C. § 644 (2000).
150. Jacobson, supra note 148, at 39.
151. Id. at40.
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does not engage in any form of homosexual activity, thus rendering
the rebuttable presumption "illusory" and "insurmountable."' 152
Once someone has been identified as homosexual, or when
forced disclosure occurs, heterosexuals often begin to make
assumptions about that person, generally thinking of them in sexual
terms, which is evidenced by the military's policy of essentially
equating homosexual orientation with homosexual conduct. 153 Thus,
self-disclosing one's sexual orientation, if homosexual, has serious
implications in the military that go much further than mere social
stigma or isolation from one's peers. Self-disclosure, at least, is
accomplished with the person's awareness of the potential
implications and an obvious acceptance of the consequences that
may follow. On the other hand, forced disclosure of homosexual
orientation in the military imposes those potential consequences on
the person without his or her permission and takes away the
autonomy that goes with making that very personal decision for
oneself. Thus, on one end of the spectrum, a person could actually
lose his military career simply because he believes himself to be a
homosexual and someone else exposes that belief. At a minimum, to
protect his career, he would have to prove that he did not act on that
belief in any way by engaging in associated homosexual conduct.
While Bowers certainly held that it was permissible for states to
criminalize homosexual conduct, it did not go so far as to say that
there is "no fundamental right to believe that one is homosexual."' 154
In the right to privacy doctrine cases, the Court protected the right to
hold certain beliefs and to be free from government intrusion into
matters that fundamentally affect personhood. 155 It does not take a
far stretch of the imagination to properly place one's beliefs about
their own sexuality and preferences for intimate associations into the
"zone of privacy" established in Griswold. Yet, under the military
policy now in place, a third party can violate such privacy with the
result being not only the loss of personal dignity, but the loss of
many years of building a military career and the political right to
serve one's country.
152. Debra A. Luker, Comment, The Homosexual Law and Policy in the Military: "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell, Don't Pursue, Don't Harass"... Don't Be Absurd!, 3 SCHOLAR 267, 300
(2001).
153. Herek, supra note 134, at 207.
154. Phyllis E. Mann, Comment, "If the Right of Privacy Means Anything": Exclusion from
the United States Military on the Basis of Sexual Orientation, 46 SMU L. REV. 85, 116 (1992).
155. Id.
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D. Sexual Orientation in the Workplace
Many of the sentiments expressed above are also applicable to
forced disclosure of sexual orientation in the workplace. The
employment relationship is one of the most important relationships
in a person's life with its success being founded on mutual trust,
loyalty, respect and good faith. 156 The success of the relationship
can be destroyed when a person's private information is disclosed to
others, especially such intensely private, personal information as
one's sexual orientation.
Employment discrimination is one very common result of
disclosing sexual orientation in the workplace. 157  Employment
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is arguably harmful
both economically and psychologically. 158 Similar to the military
environment, a worker is aware of the culture within which he exists
and works. If he chooses to disclose his homosexual orientation
voluntarily, he is likely to be aware of how he might be received and
accordingly treated. For those same reasons, he may choose not to
disclose his orientation. Yet, this choice does not prevent that
information from being disclosed to others in the workplace without
one's permission. There are a variety of sources from which such
information may be either found out or inferred: "military discharge
records, arrests or convictions, marital status, residential
neighborhood, silences in conversations, and so on." 159 A variety of
negative consequences might occur from such disclosure.' 60 Some
of these include harassment by coworkers and bosses, termination,
and refusals to promote. 16 1 In turn, the consequences of a forced
revelation (or even voluntary disclosure) of one's sexuality can result
in lost productivity, income, and future advancement. Thus, the
consequences for homosexual individuals in the workplace are real.
In a survey of 191 employers in Anchorage, Alaska, 18% would fire
homosexuals, 27% would not hire them at all if aware of their status,
and 26% would not promote them. 163 Unfortunately, there are few
156. JOHN D. R. CRAIG, PRIVACY AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 24 (1999).
157. M. V. Lee Badgett, The Wage Effects of Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 48 INDUS.
& LAB. REL. REV. 726, 727 (1995).
158. Id. at 726.
159. Id. at 728.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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laws that protect homosexual individuals from such discrimination in
public sector employment. 164
Again, the disclosure of such private information may carry
negative consequences, and it must be up to the individual, being
aware of this possibility, to choose to face those consequences.
When forced disclosure occurs, an individual is subjected to
potentially life-altering consequences over which he has no control.
Just as the right of privacy protects certain sexually related medical
conditions, 165-so it should protect the private nature of one's sexual
orientation. Unwarranted exposure of either could result in
"discrimination and intolerance."' 66  The constitutional right to
privacy should be extended to protection from forced disclosure of
sexual orientation so as to allow individuals to choose for themselves
how and when such information is disseminated. To do otherwise
violates the fundamental right of privacy established long ago by the
United States Supreme Court.
IV. EXTENDING THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY TO FORCED
DISCLOSURE OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION
Most individuals who read the facts of Sterling would agree that
the circumstances of Marcus Wayman's suicide were disturbing.
The disposal of his life seems wasteful and shameful, and more
importantly, possibly preventable. One might wonder if the outcome
would have been the same had the constitutional parameters of the
privacy doctrine been better defined so as to protect such disclosure.
Quite possibly, Officer Wilinsky might have acted more prudently
had the police department been required to comply with a stricter
and more established constitutional privacy doctrine. The only
answer now is to attempt to clarify the privacy doctrine's definition
in the realm of sexual orientation disclosure. The Third Circuit's
opinion in Sterling, the test put forth in Walls, and Blackmun's
dissenting opinion in Bowers act together to help accomplish this.
164. Susan J. Becker, The Immorality of Publicly Outing Private People, 73 OR. L. REV. 159,
181 (1994).
165. See, e.g, Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107, 112 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that "individuals
who are transsexuals are among those that possess a constitutional right to maintain medical
confidentiality" and stating "[tihe excruciatingly private and intimate nature of transsexualism,
for persons who wish to preserve privacy in the matter, is really beyond debate").
. 166. See Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994).
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A. The Correctness of Sterling v. Borough of Minersville
The Third Circuit recognized that the boundaries of the
constitutional right to privacy have not been clearly defined. 167 After
shedding some light on the history of the doctrine, the Third Circuit
pointed out that the Supreme Court many years ago held that "the
constitutional right to privacy respects not only an individual's
autonomy in intimate matters, but also an individual's interest in
avoiding divulgence of highly personal information." 168 This would
seem to apply directly to the kind of information that would be
disclosed when dealing with the confidentiality of sexual orientation.
However, the Third Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme Court
has never "definitively" extended the right to privacy in this area.
169
In doing so, the Third Circuit dealt squarely with the holding in
Bowers and determined that Bowers is not determinative of this issue
because it did not deal with homosexual status, but rather dealt with
homosexual conduct and more particularly, sodomy. 170  In other
words, Bowers did not comment on whether privacy protection
extends to the "personal decision of sexual preference."' 171  The
holding in Bowers was limited to criminalized sexual conduct.
The Third Circuit, however, then went on to describe some of its
own holdings, concluding that together they demonstrated an
''encompassing view of information entitled to a protected right of
privacy."' 172 The court evaluated the following areas of information:
1) private medical information-determinin7 it was protected
because it contains intimate personal facts;' 2) answers to
questions about medical, financial and behavioral information-
concluding that the inquiries themselves did not invade privacy, but
that such information had to be protected from disclosure due to its
private nature; 174 3) disclosure of an employee's HIV status through
employee health plan records-allowing the disclosure only after
establishing that the government had a genuine and compelling
167. Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 193 (3d Cir. 2000).
168. Id. at 194 (citing Whalen, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977)).
169. Sterling, 232 F.3d at 194.
170. Id. at 194-95. It was here that the court disagreed with the Fourth Circuit in Walls.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 195; see United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir.
1980).
174. Sterling, 232 F.3d at 195; see Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Phila., 812 F.2d 105,
110 (3d Cir. 1987).
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interest to gather the information;' 75 and 4) a coach's requirement
that a student athlete take a pregnancy test-concluding that
compelling the test coupled with failure to protect the results from
disclosure was an infringement on the constitutional right to
privacy. 176 The Third Circuit concluded that these holdings, taken
together, demonstrate the care with which the court guards privacy,
and that it would be hard to imagine a subject more private in nature
than one's sexuality. 177 Moreover, the court determined that merely
threatening disclosure was enough to invade one's privacy
interests. 171
The reasoning in Sterling comports with the underlying
philosophy and meaning of a fundamental right to privacy. The
concept is somewhat nebulous, yet the Third Circuit's prior holdings
and reasoning in this case demonstrate that autonomy in private,
intimate matters is at the core of the doctrine. Sexual orientation
surely falls into this arena, and individuals have a right to be free
from forced disclosure and interference with such personal aspects of
their life.
B. The Privacy Test in Walls v. City of Petersburg
Despite the Fourth Circuit's failure to follow its own test for
determining what belongs in the "zone of privacy," the test itself
adds further clarification of the kinds of matters that the doctrine of
privacy covers. The court put forth its test clearly:
As the first step in determining whether the information sought is
entitled to privacy protection, courts have looked at whether it is
within an individual's reasonable expectations of confidentiality.
The more intimate or personal the information, the more jsified is
the expectation that it will not be subject to public scrutiny.
As indicated by the Third Circuit, it is difficult to imagine more
personal and intimate information than the nature of one's
sexuality. 180  Because it is so personal, most people would expect
that such information is not open for public disclosure or state
interference without a compelling interest, and thus the expectation
of confidentiality is high. The Fourth Circuit did not utilize its own
175. Sterling, 232 F.3d at 195; see Doe v. Southeastern Penn. Transp. Auth., 72 F.3d 1133,
1141 (3d Cir. 1995).
176. Sterling, 232 F.3d at 196; see Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 303 (3d Cir. 2000).
177. Sterling, 232 F.3d at 196.
178. Id. at 197.
179. Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 192 (4th Cir. 1990).
180. Sterling, 232 F.3d at 196.
test when determining whether the police department invaded Walls'
zone of privacy by asking her whether she had engaged in
homosexual relations (thereby forcing her to disclose the nature of
her sexual orientation), but instead went straight to the conclusory
statement that Bowers was controlling.' 8 1 Had the Fourth Circuit
applied this analytical step to the facts in Walls, it is likely that its
own holding would have been different.
C. Justice Blackmun's Dissent in Bowers
While not the rule of law, Justice Blackmun's dissent adds
valuable perspective to what the right to privacy entails. Blackmun
points out two lines of privacy that the Court has acknowledged: 1)
the recognition of a "privacy interest with reference to certain
decisions that are properly for the individual to make" and 2) the
recognition of a "privacy interest with reference to certain places
without regard for the particular activities in which the individuals
who occupy them are engaged."' 182 Making a personal decision to
disclose the nature of one's sexual orientation would fall in the first
line of recognition. Blackmun pointed out that the majority was
misguided in proliferating the idea that its holding amounted only to
a refusal to recognize a fundamental right to engage in sodomy.'
83
Rather, he stated, "what the Court has really refused to recognize is
the fundamental interest all individuals have in controlling the nature
of their intimate associations with others." 184 Individuals have a
right to be free from interference with the disclosure of personal
details about their personhood. As Justice Blackmun stated, "[o]nly
the most willful blindness could obscure the fact that sexual intimacy
is 'a sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central to family
life, community welfare, and the development of human
personality."", 185 The nature of one's sexual orientation is just as
intimate and private, and no person should have the broad right to
forcibly disclose that information about another. Forced disclosure
has potentially severe implications, and the nature of one's sexual
orientation is just the kind of private information that the
constitutional right of privacy is put forth to protect. It is certainly
separable from the right to engage in criminal activities, as sodomy
181. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193 (1986); Sterling, 232 F.3d at 195 n.3.
182. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 204-05 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
183. Id. at 206.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 205 (quoting Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973)).
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is in some states.
V. CONCLUSION
While the doctrine of constitutional privacy is not precisely
defined, one can reason that the zone of privacy includes one's
sexual orientation. The Griswold line of cases protected intimacy in
marriage, contraception outside of the context of marriage, the right
to marry the person of one's choice, the right to terminate a
pregnancy, and the right to be free from interference with the
constitution of one's family. All of these rights demonstrate the
Court's desire to protect individuals from undue interference with
the most personal and fundamentally private aspects of their lives.
This does not mean, however, that the government never has a right
to interfere with these aspects, just that the government must show a
genuine and compelling interest to do so.
Forced disclosure of sexual orientation may have the same
devastating effects on an individual as would denying women the
right to choose whether to terminate a pregnancy. These effects
include distress, psychological harm, mental and physical difficulties
and social stigma-the Court noted all of these effects in Roe v.
Wade when it decided to protect a woman's right to choose to
terminate a pregnancy (an inherently private matter). To reason that
these effects are less important to an individual in the context of
disclosing the private nature of one's sexuality defies common sense.
Sexual orientation deserves the same protection. Such protection can
be achieved without undermining the holding in Bowers, as Bowers
deals only with a state's right to criminalize sexual conduct such as
sodomy. That case does not extend so far as to say that a state can
disclose or require disclosure of sexual orientation or sexual activity
that by its very nature forces sexual orientation to be known.
The Third Circuit in Sterling captured the essence of the privacy
doctrine in its ruling, as did the dissenting opinion in Bowers. Our
Constitution protects our right to "be let alone" and preserves
expected matters of confidentiality from unwarranted government
intrusion. Individuals have the right to expect that certain private
matters are beyond the unfettered reach of the state. Permitting
forced disclosure of sexual orientation offends our privacy
jurisprudence. Any holding or rule stating otherwise improperly
affects real people, real lives and has real consequences. Just ask
Marcus Wayman's mother.
Winter 2003] DISCLOSURE OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION
262 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 30:2
